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Introduction
The role of insurance in management of risk in agricultural 
production has long been the centre of attention for research-
ers and policy makers. Agricultural insurance products were 
fi rst offered by private companies approximately two hundred 
years ago, initially in Europe and then in the United States 
(Smith and Glauber, 2012), and these followed different 
development paths during the progress of the two agricultural 
insurance markets (Székely and Pálinkás, 2009). The devel-
opment of these markets has required an increasing role of 
government due to the persistence of moral hazard, adverse 
selection and systemic risks problems in agricultural produc-
tion. Today, almost 90 per cent of the global agricultural pre-
mium of about USD 20 billion is collected in high-income 
countries where agricultural insurance products are heavily 
subsidised by governments (Mahul and Stutley, 2010).
The Hungarian agricultural insurance market has experi-
enced major changes during the last decade (Kemény et al., 
2012a). A new agricultural insurance system based on two pil-
lars started to operate from 2012. The fi rst pillar is the contin-
uation of the National Disaster Fund but with two important 
changes: the participation of farmers is compulsory above a 
certain farm size and there is a stricter control of the damage 
compensation. The second pillar focuses on the expansion 
of the agricultural insurance market by introducing insur-
ance fee support for farmers who contract insurance policies 
for hail, fi re, storm and winter frost damage as well as for 
drought, heavy rain and spring frost, which previously were 
not insurable risks. The insurance premiums are calculated for 
actual insurance products based on country level variables, 
except for hail risk where different variations of the (LAU1) 
micro-regional insurance premium calculation procedure are 
applied. The outcome of these country level insurance pre-
miums for different weather risks is the formation of very 
heterogeneous risks communities, and this does not permit 
the sustainable operation of an agricultural insurance system.
Many studies in the Hungarian agricultural economics 
literature (e.g. Csete, 2004; Pesti et al., 2004) emphasise the 
importance of exploring the effects of micro-regional weather 
impacts on variations in the yield of agricultural crops but do 
so without having conducted any empirical investigations 
since the political and economic changes of 1989. Empiri-
cal observations suggest that the main weather risk factors 
vary widely among macro-regions as well as among micro-
regions, implying the need for a more detailed examination 
of the effects of the weather on crop yields. Therefore the 
objective of this study is to estimate the optimal insurance 
premiums for the stakeholders of the Hungarian agricultural 
insurance market, based on micro-regional weather condi-
tions. These should take into account the willingness to pay 
of farmers, the fi nancial capacities of insurance companies 
and the governmental budget resources.
The structure of the article is as follows. The next sec-
tion presents the theoretical and empirical background of the 
paper, and this is followed by a description of the methodol-
ogy and data used to achieve the research objectives. The 
penultimate section contains the results of our calculations 
and the fi nal section concludes with six policy implications.
Theoretical background
The estimation of insurance premiums is based on two 
primary principles of risk management. On the one hand, an 
equitable insurance system is characterised in the long term 
by the parity of the total insurance premium and the expected 
value of the damage incurred. On the other, farmers’ deci-
sions are characterised by a risk aversion attitude in the long 
term, implying that they are disposed to pay higher insurance 
premiums than the compensation value of their crop damage 
for assuring incomes from their farm operations. If these con-
ditions are valid the insurance premium covers the compensa-
tion for damage incurred while the extra charge attributable 
to the risk aversion attitude of farmers covers the earnings 
and costs of insurance companies (Zweifel and Eisen, 2012).
However these principles do not always apply in the short 
term. Before introducing a comprehensive insurance product 
covering drought, heavy rain and spring frost risks the insur-
ance premium system should take into account the following 
essential conditions: (i) the insurance premium should be set 
at an acceptable level for producers; (ii) the damage com-
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pensation should not overload insurance companies even in 
years with high rates of damage; (iii) the insurance premium 
for every crop should cover the costs of insurance at least 
at national level even if this objective cannot be achieved 
for every micro-region; (iv) the insurance premium system 
should not be too complex and there must not be exagger-
ated differences between producers’ insurance premiums 
(Kemény et al., 2012b).
The acceptable level of insurance premiums for farmers 
(i) is considered to be 2-3 per cent of the output. Even con-
sidering the maximum of allowed governmental support of 
insurance premiums (65 per cent) in the European Union, the 
total insurance premium paid by farmers complemented by 
the governmental insurance premium support cannot exceed 
5 per cent of the farm output of insured product due to the 
low willingness to pay of farmers for insurance (Kemény et 
al., 2010).
That damage compensation should not overload insur-
ance companies even in years with high rates of damage (ii) is 
a fundamental condition for insurance companies providing 
risk management products for Hungarian agriculture as they 
have suffered losses in fi ve of the last six years. This makes it 
even harder to solve the optimisation problem of calculating 
acceptable insurance premiums for farmers and insurance 
companies while taking into account the low willingness to 
pay of farmers for agricultural insurance and the fact that 
agricultural insurance companies exhausted their reserves in 
previous years, which prevents them from accepting further 
losses in their agricultural insurance operations. An accept-
able solution for both farmers and agricultural insurance 
companies can be achieved only with governmental support 
for agricultural insurance premiums.
The condition the insurance premium for every crop 
should cover the costs of insurance (iii) states that there are 
not preferred crops where the total insurance premium col-
lected from farmers complemented by governmental support 
is lower than the damage compensation paid by insurance 
companies. This implies the differentiation of insurance pre-
miums for different crops.
The condition the insurance premium system in a micro-
region should cover the damage compensation, not be too 
complex and there must not be exaggerated differences 
between producers’ insurance premiums (iv) defi nes the 
need for a transparent and clear agricultural risk manage-
ment insurance system. Such a system would have less than 
ten insurance premium categories and in a micro-region all 
crops would fall into the same category. Moreover in every 
micro-region the collected insurance premiums should cover 
the damage compensation, which implies that the farmers are 
using crop rotation in the case of insurable crops. To over-
come inverse selection in the risk community in a micro-
region it is imperative to not have exaggerated differences 
between producers’ insurance premium rates.
Methodology
We applied the linear programming method to solve 
the multi-conditional optimisation problem when calculat-
ing micro regional level insurance premiums. The model is 
formulated according to the description of Bakos (2000). 
Matrix (1) represents a set of scenarios V = {V1, V2, …, Vm}
and a set of attributes C = {C1, C2, …, Cn}, where cij is the 
value of future i of scenario j.
 (1)
The cij values of the matrix are normalised; every row 
is transformed to values between zero and one. The rows of 
the transformed matrix contain a set of usable parameters 
U = {U1, U2, …, Un} making possible the comparability of 
the variables (2).
 (2)
 Depending on which values of attributes are pre-
ferred, lower (3) or higher (4) values of uij are calculated 
with the formula:
 (lower is preferred) (3)
or
 (higher is preferred) (4)
The p vector contains the values of weighting parameters 
defi ned by decision maker and the sum of these values is 
one (5).
 (5)
The weighting parameters are values between zero and 
one, which are used to express the importance of usable 
parameters for selecting the most favourable solution (6).
 (6)
Owing to the gradual introduction of the limiting condi-
tions described in the previous section, in our case the insur-
ance premium optimisation matrixes have the following 
forms:
   (7)
The four conditions presented above were introduced 
gradually according to their importance, obtaining the mini-
mum values of insurance premium sums in the C triangle 
matrix and the elements of the transformed U matrix (7). 
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These matrixes are multiplied by the p column vector, which 
contains the weighting factors attributed by decision maker, 
thus providing different scenarios, among these Z which rep-
resents the optimal scenario.
Micro-regional yield loss values were calculated from 
Hungarian Statistical Offi ce data for the period 2003-2009 
collected from about 7,000 farms operating as companies. 
The yield loss is estimated in each of 173 LAU1 micro-
regions in Hungary (i.e. all micro-regions except Budapest) 
as a difference from the weighted average of the micro-
regional crop yield in the analysed period. The weights 
(p vector) are the utilised agricultural area of farms in the 
sample from a micro-region. When the yield loss for a crop 
(wheat, maize, barley, sunfl ower, rapeseed, grape and apple) 
exceeds a certain threshold in a micro-region, the farmers in 
that micro-region are entitled to compensation. We evaluated 
the compensation value in every micro-region as a product 
of yield loss of a certain crop and its average producer price.
Micro-regional meteorological data were interpolated 
from over 100 automatic weather station records provided by 
the Hungarian Meteorological Service for the same period 
(2003-2009). Applying conditions of meteorological varia-
tion to defi ne yield loss made it possible to identify all-risk 
yield losses caused by weather risks. Those yield losses that 
satisfy certain meteorological conditions are considered to 
be damage eligible for compensation. Drought is considered 
for wheat, winter barley, maize, sunfl ower and rapeseed pro-
duction when there is a lower yield than the defi ned threshold 
and the total rainfall is less than 10 mm in at least one month 
between March and September. Heavy rain risk is consid-
ered for wheat, winter barley, maize, sunfl ower and rapeseed 
production when the yield is lower than the defi ned threshold 
and in at least one month between March and September the 
average rainfall is higher than 80 mm.
Results
When calculating optimised insurance premiums that 
take into account micro-regional differences we adhered to 
the two principles of risk management identifi ed by Zweifel 
and Eisen (2012), described above. Since our intention 
was to reconcile confl icting conditions when calculating 
optimised insurance premiums, as a fi rst step we present 
here the effects of each of our four conditions on the rate of 
damage compensation and then we gradually introduce these 
conditions for solving our linear programming problem. In 
the second stage, optimised insurance premium results are 
presented based on three scenarios according to different 
deductible rates.
The relationship between damage compensation 
rates and the defi ned conditions
Damage compensation rates for when condition (i) is 
considered are presented in Figure 1. The damage compen-
sation rate is calculated as a share of damage value and insur-
ance value in the 173 micro-regions based on yearly average 
output, when the deductible rate is gradually increased from 
0 to 60 per cent (this means that the damage compensation 
threshold is decreased gradually by 10 per cent from 100 per 
cent to 40 per cent).
There are major differences among the damage compen-
sation rates of micro-regions. In the best performing micro-
region, in the case of a 100 per cent damage compensation 
threshold the justifi ed insurance premium is 2.5 per cent of 
average output while in the worst performing micro-region 
it is 18 per cent. This fi gure shows that if we wish to have 
acceptable insurance premiums for all farmers it is neces-
sary to reduce the discount or the absolute value of deducti-
bles. We can have an acceptable insurance premium rate at 
70 per cent damage compensation threshold, where in the 
worst performing micro-region the insurance premium rate 
is below 10 per cent. The same acceptable insurance pre-
mium rates can be attained at 60, 50 and 40 per cent of the 
deductible threshold.
If the insurance product fulfi ls condition (ii), i.e. that 
even in a year with heavy damage such as 2003 there are 
no losses in the insurance system of insured products, the 
results presented in Figure 2 are obtained.
In years with heavy damage almost 50 per cent of output 
is lost, which implies very high insurance premiums for 100 
per cent compensation. In this case the insurance premiums 
should be set at around 40 per cent, which is unacceptable 
for farmers if we take into account their willingness to pay 
is around 5-6 per cent. This problem can be solved in two 
ways. One possibility is to reduce the damage compensation 
threshold to 50 or 40 per cent, which means that only those 
farmers whose output decrease was higher than 50 or 60 per 
cent receive any compensation. The other possibility is to 
increase the discount of deductibles to 80 per cent.
Figure 1: Crop damage compensation rates of Hungarian LAU1 
micro-regions for different damage compensation thresholds or a 
50% discount of deductibles as an average of the period 2003-2009.
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For a crop producer the option of a damage compensa-
tion threshold set at 50 per cent seems more plausible than 
the option of a discount of damage set at 80 per cent.
Condition (iii) is to have, at least at national level, an 
insurance system where the insurance premiums cover all 
damage incurred. This can be attained by applying highly dif-
ferentiated insurance premiums for different crops (Figure 3).
For sunfl ower, with the most favourable damage compen-
sation rates, where in the micro-region with the highest dam-
age of 50 per cent, the insurance premiums can be set around 
1 per cent of the farms’ sunfl ower output value. However for 
maize, with most unfavourable damage compensation rates, 
for 30 per cent of farmers the insurance premiums can be 
set at the 2 per cent level, while in the case of most farms 
exposed to weather risks the insurance premiums should be 
set at 7 per cent of the maize output value.
Condition (iv) contains the clauses of insurance premium 
calculation at micro-regional level: on the one hand the cov-
erage of damage incurred by insurance premiums collected 
in the micro-region and on the other hand to not have exag-
gerated differences among insurance premiums paid by dif-
ferent farmers in the micro-region.
The micro-regions are classifi ed according to their dam-
age compensation threshold records averaged over seven 
years in three categories: the micro-regions characterised by 
the highest damage are connected to 40 per cent, the micro-
regions with medium damage to 50 per cent and the micro- 
regions when the least damage are connected to a 60 per cent 
yield threshold.
By applying differentiated 40-50-60 per cent absolute 
deductible rates according to the risk exposure of a micro-
region, more homogeneous insurance premium rates can 
be obtained compared to general valid average 50 per cent 
absolute deductible rate (Figure 4).
The same situation arises in the years with heavy damage, 
for example in 2003 the differentiation of micro-regions 
according to their risk exposure makes it possible to set 
lower insurance premiums for most of the farms (Figure 5).
Figure 2: Crop damage compensation rates of Hungarian LAU1 
micro-regions for different damage compensation thresholds or an 
80% discount of deductibles in 2003.
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Figure 3: Crop damage compensation rates of Hungarian LAU1 
micro-regions for different crops as an average of the period 2003-
2009, using a damage compensation threshold of 50 per cent rate 
of deductibles.
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Figure 4: Crop damage compensation rates of Hungarian LAU1 
micro-regions as an average of the period 2003-2009, using 50 per 
cent and 40-50-60 per cent rates of absolute deductibles.
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Optimisation of insurance premiums by 
gradual introduction of conditions
Introducing gradually the four conditions presented in 
the previous section and referring to our principle that the 
insurance premiums should cover damage compensation we 
developed three scenarios.
In scenario A we consider conditions (i) and (ii), which 
imply that the damage threshold is set at 50 per cent, the 
discount of deductibles is 10 per cent, the same insurance 
premium rates are applied for all crops, the damage com-
pensation rate is set at 75 per cent of the average values for 
2003-2009, and even in the case of years with high levels of 
damage compensation this cannot exceed 110 per cent.
Insurance premium rates for drought and heavy rain 
should be set threefold higher (see Kemény et al., 2012b) for 
all farmers, micro-regions and crops considering condition 
(ii) to avoid serious damage by insurance companies when 
extreme weather conditions cause a drastic fall of farm out-
put (Table 1 column 2).
Applying a fl at 3.6% insurance premium rate for compen-
sating insurance companies because of years with extreme 
crop damage contributes to increasing their profi ts. This sce-
nario can be applied only in the case of introducing a new 
insurance premium system followed by increasing the dam-
age threshold or reducing the insurance premium rates. Sce-
nario A does not satisfy our expectations as there are big dif-
ferences in damage compensation rates among different fi eld 
crops (Table 2) and there is a high redistribution of insurance 
premiums among different micro-regions (Figure 6).
In scenario B condition (iii), which does not allow cross 
fi nancing of insurance premiums between different crops, is 
considered together with conditions (i) and (ii). In this sce-
nario the conditions of scenario A are complemented with 
the condition that the same damage compensation rate is 
applied to every crop. The difference between sunfl ower, 
with the least damage, and maize, with the most damage, is 
fi vefold and the insurance premium of maize remains at an 
acceptable level (Table 1 column 3).
Scenario B allows us to calculate acceptable insurance 
premiums which handle the situation of years with extreme 
Figure 5: Crop damage compensation rates of Hungarian LAU1 
micro-regions in 2003, using 50 per cent and 40-50-60 per cent 
rates of absolute deductibles.
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Table 1: Insurance premium rates for drought and heavy rain 
insurance for fi ve crops, when cross fi nancing of insurance 
premiums between different crops is allowed or not allowed.
Crop
Insurance premium rate (%)
Allowed Not allowed
Rapeseed 3.6 3.2
Maize 3.6 5.6
Sunfl ower 3.6 1.1
Winter wheat 3.6 1.7
Winter barley 3.6 2.7
Source: own data
Table 2: Crop damage compensation rates (per cent) for drought 
and heavy rain insurance for fi ve crops for the period 2003-2009 
under scenario A.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Rapeseed 301.4 0.5 0.5 0.0  36.1 0.0 22.1
Maize 100.7 0.0 1.2 0.1 132.8 0.5 14.5
Sunfl ower  25.4 0.0 1.9 0.0  13.4 0.0  9.1
Winter wheat  63.8 0.0 0.3 0.0   9.9 0.0  4.7
Winter barley 109.5 0.0 5.2 0.0  25.1 0.0 14.6
Total damage 
compensation rate 110.0 0.1 1.1 0.1  61.6 0.2 10.7
Source: own data
Figure 6: Crop damage compensation rates of Hungarian LAU1 
micro-regions for scenarios A, i.e. taking into account conditions (i) 
and (ii), B, i.e. taking into account also condition (iii).
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damage. The insurance premiums are fi nancing the dam-
age compensation in the case of different crops (Table 3), 
thus the fi rst three conditions are held, but the problem of 
redistribution of insurance premiums among micro-regions 
remain unsolved (Figure 6). Furthermore in half of the 
micro-regions the insurance premiums are higher than in 
scenario A.
We managed without any diffi culties the inclusion of the 
fi rst three conditions in our linear programming model. But 
solving the problem of redistribution of insurance premiums 
among micro-regions (condition iv) cannot be performed 
in the same way as we have 173 micro-regions, fi ve crops 
and ten insurance premium rate categories, which results in 
an over-identifi cation model. Consequently we grouped the 
micro-regions into six categories according to their exposure 
to risk (Table 4): in the fi rst two categories, which are the 
least exposed to risk, the farmers are compensated when their 
output decreases below 60 per cent of the average output in 
the micro-region. In the third and fourth categories, namely 
those with medium exposure to risk, farmers are compen-
sated after their output decreases by 50 per cent, while in 
the last two categories of micro-regions, where the exposure 
to risk is the highest, farmers are compensated when their 
output falls below 40 per cent of the average output of the 
micro-region.
In scenario C there are six categories of micro-regions 
with three output thresholds. The risk exposure of the six 
categories of micro-regions is increasing from the fi rst to 
the sixth category. The insurance premium rates vary among 
categories of micro-regions and crop products (Table 4), and 
consequently the insurance premium rate is lower and the 
output threshold is higher in micro-regions and crop prod-
ucts with lower exposure to risk.
The inclusion of micro-regions in different categories 
according to their exposure to risk and the differentiation 
of insurance premium rates within the category of micro-
regions led to improved results: in years with heavy crop 
damage excessive compensation is avoided, the redistribu-
tion of insurance premium is reduced to an acceptable level 
and the problem of redistribution of insurance premiums 
between micro-regions are considered (Table 5).
The insurance premiums optimised in scenario C are 
lower than in scenario A (Figure 7), namely in the major-
ity of micro-regions the insurance premiums remain in an 
acceptable zone. Furthermore in this last scenario the redis-
tribution of insurance premiums among micro-regions is 
solved in an acceptable manner (see Kemény et al., 2012b).
Discussion
This study investigates the spatial distribution of natural 
risks and their effects on the yield variations in Hungarian 
crop production. The confl icting conditions presented cannot 
be entirely taken into consideration at the same time when 
insurance premiums are calculated. There are only solutions 
Table 3: Crop damage compensation rates (per cent) for drought 
and heavy rain insurance for fi ve crops for the period 2003-2009 
under scenario B.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Rapeseed 334.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 36.3 0.0 22.1
Maize  63.8 0.0 0.6 0.2 75.7 0.3  8.4
Sunfl ower  83.4 0.0 5.5 0.0 39.6 0.0 27.0
Winter wheat 133.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 18.7 0.0  8.7
Winter barley 146.3 0.0 6.3 0.0 30.1 0.0 17.6
Total damage 
compensation rate 110.0 0.1 1.1 0.1 61.6 0.2 10.7
Source: own data
Table 4: Output threshold levels and crop insurance premium rates 
for drought and heavy rain insurance in six micro-region categories.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Output thresholds 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40%
Rapeseed 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
Maize 4.0 6.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 6.0
Sunfl ower 0.8 2.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
Winter wheat 1.0 1.5 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.5
Winter barley 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Source: own data
Table 5: Crop damage compensation rates for drought and heavy 
rain insurance for fi ve crops in six micro-region categories as an 
average of the period 2003-2009 under scenario C.
1 2 3 4 5 6 Average
Rapeseed 14.0 19.0 21.3 20.2 19.9 20.5 19.6
Maize 23.1 31.7 20.2 26.3 20.6 34.5 25.5
Sunfl ower 15.5 14.3 14.9 20.6 16.1 19.3 17.5
Winter wheat 20.7 21.5 22.3 23.1 12.8 24.6 20.9
Winter barley 21.6 25.0 16.4 12.8 16.4 23.0 21.0
Total damage 
compensation rate 23.8
Source: own data
Figure 7: Crop damage compensation rates of Hungarian LAU1 
micro-regions for scenarios A, i.e. taking into account conditions (i) 
and (ii), and C, i.e. taking into account all four conditions.
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which are approaching the perfect insurance premium sys-
tem. In addition to an insurance premium system optimised 
to the interests of stakeholders ‘strategies to enhance know-
ledge and trust are needed to ensure that farm managers are 
able to utilize insurance products for readjusting their pro-
duction decisions and improving their performance’ (Spörri 
et al., 2012, p.12).
The calculation of the insurance premiums is based on 
all-risk yield loss and consequently the calculation of premi-
ums according to every type of risk is very diffi cult due to 
methodological problems. Therefore the settlement of insur-
ance premiums should be carried out with extreme caution 
taking into account the actuarially fair insurance premium 
rate, the willingness to pay for insurance of farmers (Cham-
bers, 2007) and the opinions of experts.
Our theoretical expectation was that the size of the multi-
risk insurance system payments required to cover the costs 
and the profi ts of insurance companies would not have a con-
siderable infl uence on the output and income levels of crop 
producing farms at the macro level. However the perfor-
mance of the multi-risk insurance system is beyond question 
because the macro-level income of producers suffering dam-
age is increased. According to our model estimations, during 
the years with heavy adverse weather conditions 24-35 per 
cent of farmers can suffer crop damage and their income can 
increase due to contracting multi-risk insurance by 26 per 
cent in the case of operational profi t and 36 per cent in the 
case of profi t before tax.
The micro-level performance of the multi-risk insurance 
system is not clear. The damage caused by the insurable risks 
(drought, heavy rain) reduces the income per production 
value by 15 per cent in the case of 30 per cent of farmers suf-
fering damage, while the compensation for damage is higher 
than 8 per cent only in the case of 10 per cent of farmers with 
damage due to the high absolute value of deductibles.
The policy implications of these fi ndings, which in the 
long term will allow an enlargement of the risk community 
and the reduction of exposure to risks, as well as a reduction 
in government expenditure and a certain level of profi tability 
of insurance companies, are the following:
1. The introduction of the agricultural insurance scheme 
presented here, in addition to the interests of agricultural 
producers and insurance companies, is also in the gov-
ernment interest because setting up this insurance struc-
ture allows agricultural producers to cut their fi nancial 
losses, which in turn reduces the pressures on producers 
and at the same time on the state damage mitigating fund.
2. Successful operation of this agricultural insurance scheme 
can be achieved only if the risk community grows to a 
suitable size. Therefore government support is needed 
for a rapid expansion of the risk community to this size. 
This can be achieved by means of an insurance premium 
subsidy, other allowances granted for farmers with insur-
ance contracts, or even administrative regulations that 
specify a certain level of insurance engagement.
3. Enhanced risk coverage offers the possibility of better 
protection against risks for every fi nancing organisation. 
Thus banks fi nancing agricultural crop production and 
integrators can reduce credit rescheduling and the risks 
of non-payment caused by adverse weather conditions if 
they oblige agricultural producers to take out the all-risks 
crop insurance that is available on the market.
4. Government monitoring of agricultural insurance com-
panies and market processes is required to prevent the 
increase of insurance premiums above the market equi-
librium premium level due to government stimulation of 
the spreading of agricultural insurance. Nevertheless the 
likelihood of charging extra insurance premiums because 
of the insurance fee subsidy is very low based on the 
experience of the last ten years which is characterised by 
a very low insurance damage rate.
5. The introduction of the insurance scheme presented in 
this study can be performed only with high insurance 
premiums and a high value of deductibles which would 
be expected to yield lower loss ratios for insurance com-
panies, but after the spreading of this insurance scheme 
among farmers the loss ratio should gradually decline to 
75 per cent. This should be achieved by decreasing the 
absolute value of deductibles instead of reducing the insur-
ance premiums. In this way an increased level of protec-
tion of farmers can be achieved by agricultural insurance, 
which reduces the risk of a drastic decrease in farmers’ 
profi t before tax caused by adverse weather conditions
6. The high range of yields in micro-regions indicates 
large differences in crop output in Hungarian agriculture 
within the same micro-region. Since the technological 
losses cannot be perfectly separated from losses caused 
by adverse weather conditions it is not suffi cient to clas-
sify micro-regions according their risk characteristics 
except in the short term, i.e. the year of introducing the 
insurance scheme. In the long term insurance premiums 
should be based on the individual records of loss ratios 
in the case of every crop producer, developing a bonus-
malus insurance premium system. This insurance scheme 
can adequately handle the extent of the differences in 
country-wide and micro-regional level risks due to the 
differences in natural endowments and the production 
skills of farmers. In this case, in a micro-region with a 
high loss ratio a farmer producing in favourable microcli-
matic conditions and/or with excellent production skills 
can obtain an insurance contract for her/his crop produc-
tion at a lower insurance premium, while in a micro-
region with a low loss ratio a poorly performing farmer 
should accept higher insurance premiums according to 
her/his higher loss ratio compared to the average micro-
regional loss ratio.
In conclusion, insurance in agriculture is becoming an 
essential risk management tool for farmers to handle unex-
pected effects of different shocks. The introduction in Hun-
gary of multi-risk yield insurance based on macro-regional 
and micro-regional differentiated damage thresholds, as 
well as on macro-regional and micro-regional differentiated 
insurance premiums, will help to preserve the standard of 
living of those who depend on farming, strengthen the via-
bility of farm businesses, and provide an environment which 
supports investment in the farming sector. The introduction 
of micro-regional optimised insurance premiums will lead 
to wider risk communities in agricultural production and a 
sustainable agricultural insurance system.
The effects of weather risks on agricultural insurance premiums
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